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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION-
EXERCISE OF APPEAL By INDIGENTS IN CRIMINAL ACTIONS
Defendant was convicted on four counts arising out of burglary.
With a notice of appeal he also filed a motion requesting the trial court
to direct the County Commissioners to pay for a bill of exceptions; this
motion was overruled. On appeal it was held that the defendant was not
entitled as a matter of law to a bill of exceptions at the expense of the
state upon a showing of indigency. State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E. 2d 511
(Ohio Ct. App. 1956).
The decision in the principal case was handed down less than seven
months after the Supreme Court of the United States decided the case of
Griffin v. Illinois.1 There it was held that when a state grants the right
to appellate review in criminal cases, the due process 2 and equal protection
clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment require that indigent defendants
be afforded some means of raising any alleged error in the trial court
which could have been raised under the same circumstances by a person
of sufficient means.
Though Griffin was not cited in the opinion, it appears that the
construction given by the Trunzo court to the code provisions concerning
acquisition of a bill of exceptions by a criminal defendant falls squarely
within the constitutional prohibition. Trunzo alleged indigency and
there is little doubt that he was unable to demonstrate certain of the
alleged trial court errors without a bill of exceptions.3 Nor does it ap-
pear that the trial court refused the application for a bill of exceptions
because the alleged grounds of error were asserted frivolously or in
bad faith.4 Obviously a person of sufficient means could have raised these
alleged errors by purchasing a transcript.
1 351 U.S. 12 (1956) ; noted 42 A.B.A.J. 561 (1956) ; 70 Harv. L. Rev. 126
(1956) ; 55 Mich. L. Rev. 413 (1957); 17 Ohio St. L.J. 553 (1956) ; 30 Temple
L.Q. (1956) ; 34 Texas L. Rev. 1083 (1956); 1956 U. Ill. L.F. 501 (1956) ; 10
Vand. L. Rev. 79 (1956); 3 Wayne L. Rev. 62 (1956); 59 W. Va. L. Rev. 79
(1956).
2There has been some speculation as to whether the Griffin holding in-
corporates due process as a basis of decision. See, e.g., 55 Mich. L. Rev. 415
(1957). See also the opinion of the Supreme Court of Illinois on remand.
I* * * Illinois violates the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment
(and perhaps the due process clause as well) when it denies such a review 0 * *."
People v. Griffin, 137 N.E. 2d 485, 486 (Ill. 1956). But cf. the dissenting opinion
of Judge Frank in U.S. v. Johnson, 238 F. 2d 565, 567 (1956), where he states
without qualification that the Griffin decision rests on both clauses.
3 "The other errors assigned are not argued in the defendant's brief and,
therefore, will not be considered. Such claims of error are not considered for the
further reason that they could only be demonstrated by a bill of exceptions which
was not filed in this case." State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E. 2d 511, 513 (Ohio Ct. app.
1956).
4 In this connection see infra note 15, and the discussion of U.S. v. Johnson
in the text.
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If, then, this decision disregards the fundamental guarantees an-
nounced in Griffin, the state court's reliance upon statute is unavailing.
By virtue of Article VI, paragraph two of the Constitution of the
United States, that instrument's requirements are controlling, notwith-
standing the absence of state enabling legislation. The constitutional
minimum must be observed. The language of Griffin was carefully
framed to avoid the implication that this minimum required the states to
furnish bills of exception if some other method of demonstrating alleged
trial court errors were available. Seemingly, then, some document short
of a full transcript, such as a bystander's bill of exceptions, would
suffice.
Despite the statutory construction adopted in the principal case,
there is some evidence indicating that the General Assembly of Ohio,
even prior to Griffin, intended to provide more adequately for requests
such as that made by Trunzo. A literal reading of Revised Code
§§2301.23-2301.25' gives no suggestion that it is within the discretion
of the trial court to refuse the application of an indigent criminal de-
fendant for a bill of exceptions. The court, however, noted that these
sections must be read in pari materia with Revised Code §2953.036
which makes reference to a tender of proper fees with an application
for a complete certified transcript of record. Based on this section it
concluded that free transcripts are a matter of grace and that trial
courts are not required in all events to grant such requests as made by
Trunzo.
As authority for this construction the court cites the case of Poppa
52301.23 Transcripts of testimony furnished party if requested.
When shorthand notes have been taken in a case * * *, if the court, either
party to the suit, or his attorney, requests transcripts of any portion of such notes
in longhand, the shorthand reporter reporting the case shall make full and ac-
curate transcripts thereof for the use of such court or party.
2301.24 Compensation for making transcripts and copies.
• The compensation for transcripts made in criminal cases, by request
of the prosecuting attorney or the defendant, and transcripts ordered by the court
in either criminal or civil cases, and copies of decisions and charges furnished by
direction of the court shall be paid from the county treasury, and taxed and
collected as other costs. * * I (Emphasis added).
2301.25 Costs of transcript.
When ordered by the prosecuting attorney or the defendant in a criminal
case * * * the costs of transcripts mentioned in section 2301.23 of the Revised
Code, shall be taxed as costs in the case, collected as other costs, and paid by the
clerk of courts of common pleas, quarterly, into the general treasury, and credited
to the general fund. * * ' (Emphasis added).
62953.03 Transcript to be furnished.
On application by or on behalf of the accused, to an officer required to make
a record or docket entries in a criminal case 0 * * and upon tender of the proper
fee, such officer shall make and deliver to such accused, or his counsel, a complete
certified transcript of the record, omitting therefrom, if so requested, a bill of
exceptions. ** * (Emphasis added).
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v. TWfanamaker.7 The support lent by that case may be questioned on
several grounds. The application in the Poppa case was made several
years after the right of appeal had lapsed and was refused on those
grounds, while the appeal in Trunzo was timely.' That the Poppa court
was concerned with the application for a transcript solely under those
circumstances is further illustrated by the authority cited for its decision.
In State v. Edwards' the defendant failed to file a notice of appeal
within the time prescribed by statute. There the defendant argued that
failure to allow an appeal after the statutory time limit had elapsed was
a denial of due process of law. The court held that it was wholly within
the discretion of the state to allow appeal or not, and that once allowed,
it may be granted on such terms and conditions as the legislature deems
proper. While the application of this principle to the setting of time
limits on the exercise of appeal is undoubtedly sound, its validity as a
general proposition can no longer be accepted. Indeed this was, as the
major premise of the prosecution, rejected in Griffin v. Illinois."°
The construction argued for by Trunzo finds support from at least
two sources. In the course of the majority opinion in Griffin v. Illinois,
Revised Code §2301.24"1 is cited in a context 12 suggesting that it pro-
vides transcripts for criminal defendants upon a showing of indigency.
The opinion of Justice Black does not suggest that he anticipated the
construction put on this section by the Trunzo court.
The Attorney General of Ohio, in 1935, rendered an opinionl
'a
as to whether the Court stenographer might require fees to be paid in
advance when a defendant, convicted of a felony, requests a transcript
7128 N.E. 2d 764 (Ohio 1954).
s Within three days of judgment and sentence, defendant filed a motion for
new trial which was overruled on January 16, 1956. Notice of appeal and motion
for a bill of exceptions were filed January 25, 1956. State v. Trunzo, 137 N.E. 2d
511, 512 (Ohio 1956).
9 157 Ohio St. 175, 105 N.E. 2d 259 (1952).
10 See supra note 1.
11 See supra note 5.
12 "All of the states now provide some method of appeal from criminal con-
victions, recognizing the importance of appellate review to correct adjudication of
guilt or innocence. Statistics show that a substantial proportion of criminal con-
victions are reversed by state appellate courts. Thus to deny adequate review to
the poor means that many of them may loose their life, liberty or property because
of unjust convictions which appellate courts would set aside. Many states have
recognized this and provide aid for the convicted defendants who have a right to
appeal and need a transcript but are unable to pay for it. [Ohio Revised Code
§2301.24 is cited at this point]. A few have not. Such denial is a misfit in a
country dedicated to affording equal justice to all and special privileges to none
in the administration of its criminal law. There can be no equal justice when the
kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money he has. Destitute
defendants must be afforded as adequate appellate review as defendants who
have money enough to buy transcripts." Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 18 (1956).
13 1935 O.A.G. No. 3645.
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for the purpose of appeal on error. 4 With particular reference to the
"tender of proper fees" provision stressed in Trunzo, the opinion proceeds:
A careful examination of these sections tends to the conclusion
that the legislature intended that the defendant should advance
to the clerk of courts the cost of preparing the transcript of the
docket and journal entries and not that the defendant must
advance the cost of preparing the transcript of testimony and
charges of the Court. While perhaps not relevant to the
question, it might be pertinent to point out that any other con-
clusion than the one herein reached would seriously jeopardize
the chances of an indigent prisoner having his conviction re-
viewed by an appellate court.
It appears, then, that there is some basis for including the applica-
tions of indigent defendants for a full bill of exceptions within the
present statutory framework. But whether or not the present statutory
wording can properly be said to meet this newly fixed constitutional re-
quirement, the desirability of legislative revision should be carefully
considered.
An example of the problems likely to arise under the present Ohio
statutes is found in the case of U. S. v. Johnson.'i That case was one
of the first to test the scope of the Griffin doctrine. There an indigent's
request for leave to appeal in forma pauperis was denied upon the trial
court's certification that the appeal was frivolous, lacking in merit, and
not taken in good faith. Over the vigorous dissent of the late Judge
Frank, the applicability of Griffin was denied.
The United States Supreme Court reversed this disposition in a
Per Curiam opinion16 without reference to the Griffin case, the effect of
which was argued at length in both majority and dissenting opinions in
the Court of Appeals. While the Supreme Court avoided an express
endorsement of the views set forth by Judge Frank in his dissent, it is
interesting to note that he felt compelled by Griffin, not only to regard
the trial court's certification of bad faith as subject to review, but also
to appoint counsel to assist in presenting the grounds of alleged error.
The Supreme Court subsequently directed the appointment of counsel.
The implications of Griffin, then, go beyond the mere refusal of
the trial court to furnish an indigent with a transcript for appeal. Its
rationale seems clearly to extend previous requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment for the appointment of counsel at state expense at both trial
and appellate levels.17 The equal protection basis of Griffin seems to
14 The code sections construed in the opinion were General Code §§1552, 1553
and 13459-2, the forerunners of Revised Code §§2301.24, 2301.25 and 2953.03 re-
spectively, set forth in notes 5 and 6, supra. There has been substantially no
change from the provisions in effect in 1935.
15238 F. 2d 565 (1956).
1677 Sup. Ct. 550 (1957).
17 See generally, BEANY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL. See also 17 Ohio St. L.J. 553, 556
(1956). At present the state must appoint trial counsel for indigent defendants in
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extend to state provision for all expenses necessarily incurred to take
reasonable advantage of the right of appeal. The necessity of counsel
in most cases is apparent. Under present Ohio law there is no doubt
that adequate provisions have been made for the assistance of counsel
in trial court proceedings."8 There does not, however, seem to be a
clear holding that this right to the appointment of counsel extends to the
exercise of appeal.
It seems beyond the necessary exercise of judicial competence to
provide, under present statutes, for solutions to all the problems raised
by Grtffin. As cases of this nature appear before appellate courts, they
will be needlessly burdened with devising instructions on remand which
comply with the dictates of the Fourteenth Amendment. More appro-
priate would be legislation providing, at state expense, an unqualified
right to a free transcript and to the assistance of counsel at both trial
and appellate levels. While more conservative action would meet the
minimum requirements of Gy4ffin, such minimal legislation would
probably be subjected to repeated attacks in this era of expanding due
process and equal protection. 9 A progressive legislature should not dis-
count the more liberal approach in the absence of convincing evidence
that the cost to the state would be prohibitive or that a breakdown of
criminal appellate machinery would result.2
William W. Wehr*
all capital cases but in non-capital cases only when special circumstances exist.
Due process and equal protection do not require the state to provide counsel in the
usual non-capital case nor for the prosecution of an appeal.
Is Ohio Revised Code §§2941.50 and 2941.51.
19The Judicial Council of Ohio has suggested that Revised Code §2301.25
be amended by addition of the following sentence: "The court of common pleas
may require the defendant in a criminal case to make an advance deposit to
secure the cost of such transcript, but if the defendant makes an affidavit of in-
ability either to prepay or to give security for such transcript, the charge for
preparation thereof shall be taxed and collected as other costs." Thirteenth Report
of the Judicial Council of Ohio to the General Assembly of Ohio, 19. At this
writing that suggestion has been incorporated in proposed Senate Bill No. 267,
102nd General Assembly.
20As regards cost to the state and the crowding of appellate dockets, see
Judge Frank's dissent in U.S. v. Johnson, 238 F. 2d 565, 571 (1956). Note also the
admonition of Beany: "Certain states have created an example which all might
follow with advantage. But here, as in other matters of law, the decisions of the
federal courts will bring about change and advance in piecemeal fashion. Yet
advancement there must be in the conduct of the state courts if the hand of the
United States Supreme Court is to be restrained." BEANY, RIGHT TO COUNSEL, 141.
OCo-Winner of the Donald S. Teller Memorial Award.
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LABOR LAw-TAFT-HARTLEY AcT-EFFECT OF 60 DAY "COOLING-
OFF" PROVISION ON MODIFICATION OF LONG TERM AGREEMENTS
Respondent Lion Oil Company and the Oil Workers International
Union CIO, entered into a collective agreement which contained a
two-step provision for modification and termination, as follows:
This agreement shall remain in full force and effect for a
period beginning October 23, 1950, and ending October 23,
1951, and thereafter in this Article provided. This agreement
may be cancelled and terminated by the Company or the
Union as of a date subsequent to October 23, 1951, by com-
pliance with the following procedure:
(a) If either party to this agreement desires to amend the
terms of this agreement, it shall notify the other party in
writing of its desire to that effect, by registered mail. No such
notice shall be given prior to August 24, 1951. 'Within the
period of 60 days, immediately following the date of the
receipt of said notice by the party to which notice is so de-
livered, the Company and the Union shall attempt to agree
to the desired amendments to this agreement.
(b) If an agreement with respect to amendment of this agree-
ment has not been reached within the 60 day period mentioned
in the sub-section immediately preceding, either party may
terminate this agreement thereafter upon not less than sixty
days' written notice to the other. Any such notice of termina-
tion shall state the date upon which the termination of this
agreement shall be effective.
The union served notice on the company on August 24, 1951 and
all provisions of section (a) of the agreement were fulfilled. At the
time of the written notification to the company, the union sent copies of
the notice to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service and to the
Arkansas Labor Commissioner to comply with §8(d)(3) of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, as amended (commonly known as the Taft-
Hartley Act). Without giving separate notification in compliance with
section (b) of the contract the union struck the plant on April 30, 1952.
Since no notice was given setting up a termination date for the contract,
a collective bargaining agreement was in effect at all times up to the
date of the strike. The company declared the strike to be in violation of
§8(d) (4) of the Act. This section provides:
Where there is in effect a collective bargaining contract,
covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the
duty to bargain collectively shall also mean that no party shall
terminate or modify such contract unless the party desiring
such termination or modification * * * (4) continues in full
force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the
terms and conditions of the existing contract for a period of
sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration
date of such contract, whichever occurs later: * * *
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The effect of failing to observe the "cooling-off" period is stipu-
lated in the same subsection as loss of "status as an employee of the
employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of
sections 8, 9 and 10 of this Act * * *"
Section 10 designates the methods by which the employee may obtain
redress against actions of the employer which are listed in §8 as unfair
labor practices. Therefore, an employee who has struck in violation of
§8(d)(4) is not entitled to any protection under the Act even though
such employer activity is listed as an unfair labor practice under §8.
During the strike the company refused to bargain collectively and
attempted to coerce the union into ending the strike by summarily dis-
charging some striking workers and forcing others to sign restrictive
agreements in order to be reinstated. Contending that the activities of
the company during the strike were unfair labor practices as set forth in
§§8(a)(1), (3) and (5), the union filed a charge with the National
Labor Relations Board. The union claimed that it had not violated the
"cooling-off" provision of the Act and therefore was still entitled to its
protection.
The Board found that the notices sent to the Mediation Service and
to the Labor Commissioner complied with §8(d) (3) of the Act. Point-
ing out that the contract under which the parties were operating con-
tained no specific expiration date within itself, the NLRB held that the
notice of desire to modify given on August 24, followed by a wait of
more than sixty days, satisfied the notice requirement of the Act. The
NLRB ordered the company to cease and desist from the conduct
charged.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit set aside
the Board's order on the authority of its interpretation of the "cooling-
off" requirement in United Packinghouse Workers, CIO v. NLRB, 210
F. 2d 325 (8th Cir. 1954). The court construed the term "expiration
date" as used in §8 to be synonymous with the termination date as set out
in the contract. The court reasoned that since the notice to terminate, as
mentioned in the contract, had not been given, the contract had not ex-
pired at the time of the strike and therefore the strikers had not complied
with §1(d) (4). The court held that since the strikers had violated this
waiting requirement of the Act, they necessarily lost their status as
employees under the disabling clause of that provision and therefore had
no standing to file a charge with the Board. The United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari. Held: reversed, the Supreme Court adopting an
interpretation of §8(d)(4) which was substantially the same as that
reached by the majority of the NLRB; i.e., that the term "expiration
date" as used in the Act with reference to employment agreement is
meant to encompass both the termination date of the agreement and the
earliest date at which the agreement may be substantially modified.
National Labor Relations Board v. Lion Oil Company, 325 U.S. 282
(1957).
19571
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In a unanimous opinion handed down by Mr. Chief Justice Warren
the Supreme Court recognized that its responsibility lay in reaching a
decision which reconciled, insofar as possible, the two major congressional
purposes set forth in the Act: (1) stabilization of industrial relations,
and (2) preservation of the freedom of labor to organize to better its
conditions through collective bargaining.' The court had previously recog-
nized that its function is to balance these divergent policies in the public
interest and to avoid an interpretation of the "cooling-off" provision
which would serve neither of these purposes.2
The court expressed its awareness that the need for clarification of
the scope of §8(d) had become increasingly acute the past few years,3
since in the interest of industrial stability provisions for reopening con-
tracts for negotiation during their lifetime are becoming more common
and the trend is toward executing labor contracts of longer duration.I
These provisions are generally triggered by the occurrence of certain
specified events,5 or of a specified date.6
An analysis of the language of the statute and its legislative history
supports the Supreme Court's interpretation of the scope of §8(d). This
section contains three basic points. First, it defines collective bargaining.
Secondly, it outlines a four-step procedure with which a party must
comply before resorting to strike or lock-out: (1) serve written notice
upon the other party sixty days prior to the exp ration date thereof, or,
as in the present case, in the event the contract contains no expiration
date, sixty days prior to the proposed termination or modification,
(2) an offer to meet and bargain with the other party, (3) notification
of the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days
after notice is given to the other party and a simultaneous notification
to the state agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within
the state where the dispute occurs, (4) continuation of all terms and
conditions of the existing contract without resorting to strike or lock-out
1 National Labor Relations Act, §§1, 8(d) as amended 29 U.S.C.A. §§151,
158(d); Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, §1(b) 29 U.S.C.A., §141(b).
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956); Milk Drivers and Dairy
Emp., Local 680 v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 39 N.J. Super. 163, 120 A. 2d 630 (1956);
31 Am. Jur. 886; 173 ALR 1402.
2 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 1.
3 The ambiguity of §8 (d) (4) had led to four divergent interpretations in the
present, action, three within the NLRB, the agency charged with effectuating the
purpose of labor legislation; see also S. Rep. No. 986, 2d Sess., 62, 80th Cong.
4BNA, Collective Bargaining Negotiations and Contract Service, 36:301;
Majority Senate Report, S. Rep. No. 105, 1st Sess., 24, 80th Cong.
5 Merchants' Ladies Garment Assn. and ILGWU, (Increase in Cost of
Living Index) ; Block Bros. Tobacco Co. and Brewery Workers Union, (Increase
in Cost of Specific Product) ; Central States Carriers and Teamsters Union
(Runaway Deflation); BNA, CBN & CS, 36:305-6.
6 General Electric Corp. and IUE, (Three Years); Armour and Co. and
Packinghouse Workers Union (reopenings within specified six month periods);
BNA 303-4.
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for a period of sixty days after notice or until the expiration date of
such contract whichever occurs later. The third major point of §8(d)
is the disabling clause referred to above.
Congress expressed the dominant purpose of §8(d) to be the pre-
vention of the damaging effects of strikes brought without warning and
to allow a cooling-off period during which differences might be discussed.7
Since, in the present action, a notice of dispute was given to all the
parties listed in §8(d) and was followed by collective bargaining for a
period in excess of the required sixty days, it appears that the company
could claim neither lack of warning nor lack of a "cooling-off" period.
Therefore, it seems the congressional purpose for this section has been
fullfilled.
The meaning of the language in §8(d)(4), "or until the expi-
ration date of such contract, whichever occurs later," hinges upon the
congressional meaning of the term "expiration date." The term is used
in §8(d) (1) in conjunction with the terms "modification" and "termi-
nation". The Court noted that a notice of desired modification as well
as a notice of desired termination would typically be served in advance
of the date on which the contract was by its own terms subject to
modification or termination. Therefore, the Court concluded that the
congressional intent was to use "expiration date" to encompass both this
modification date and the termination date in §8(d)(1). The Supreme
Court supposed it reasonable to attribute a similar meaning to the same
phrase in §8(d)(4).
The Court of Appeals seemingly failed to separate the sanctions
provided in §8(d) (4) from the notice provisions set out in the contract
itself. However, the majority Senate report for the Act stressed that
failure to comply with contractual notice requirements which are more
stringent than those expressed in §8'(d) (4) is not an unfair labor practice
if the Act itself is satisfied."0 Therefore, for the purposes of the dis-
abling clause in § 8(d) (4), a breach of contract which does not involve
a breach of the Act, is irrelevant.
Section 8(d) (3) of the Act makes it an unfair labor practice for a
union to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer over modifica-
tions of collective agreements. It would be anomalous to force the
union to bargain and at the same time to deprive the union of the power
to strike, which is a major force depended on to facilitate arriving at
satisfactory agreements. The Supreme Court strove to arrive at an
interpretation which would be consistent with §13 of the Act which
warns against interpreting any part of the Act in such a manner as to
793 Cong. Rec. 3S39, 5005, 5014.
8 Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, supra note 1.
9 S. Rep. No. 986, pt. 3 80th Cong. 2d Sess., at p. 62, reaches a similar con-
clusion.
10 S. Rep. No. 105 on S. 1126, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 25.
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restrict the freedom of the union to strike unless the restriction is ex-
pressly provided for in the Act." Congress recognized that the right
of the union to bargain would be an empty one without the right to,
strike after a sixty day notice.12
The desirability of long term collective bargaining agreements with
provisions to reopen from time to time for modification seems evident if
the industrial stability towards which the Act is aimed is to be achieved.
The construction given §8(d) (4) by the Court of Appeals would defeat
these objectives. The unions would refuse to enter into them if the
right to economic weapons in support of reasonable modifications were
to be denied in the absence of agreed no-strike terms in the contract. In
its struggle to retain some measure of freedom to bargain and equality
of bargaining power with the employer the union would be forced to
try to obtain the shortest term contract available, thereby disrupting, not
achieving, industrial stability.
On the other hand, the Supreme Court's interpretation preserves
an equality of bargaining power between management and labor so that
stability can be realized through long-term collective bargaining agree-
ments which are meaningful. The union is protected by being allowed
to retain its strike threat as bargaining power to achieve modifications in
a contract where the parties have provided for substantial changes in its
provisions subject only to the notice requirements of §8(d). The em-
ployer is protected by the limitation on the strike threat afforded by the
notice requirement and waiting period of the section. The employer
may further protect himself by insertion of a no-strike clause in the
contract. However, the Supreme Court's construction assures that, while
the union may bargain away its right to strike, it won't be deprived of it
without its consent.
By a process of looking to the whole law and its purposes the Su-
preme Court has arrived at a statutory construction which successfully
furthers both major purposes of the Taft-Hardey Act and, on this pre-
viously highly ambiguous point, has achieved the balancing effect for
which the proponents of the Act were striving.
Don R. Work
11 "Nothing in this Act, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be
construed so as either to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the
right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifi'ations of that right." 49 Stat.
457, as amended; 29 U.S.C.A., §163.
12 S. Rep. No. 9S6, pt. 3, 80th Cong., 2d Sess., p. 62. This point was recog-
nized by Senator Taft, who in 1949 introduced a clarifying amendment to §8(d).
See S. Rep. No. 99, pt. 2, 81st Cong., 1st Sess., p. 42. The amendment passed the
Senate, 95 Cong. Rec. 8717, but did not become law. See also Subcommittee on
Labor and Labor Management Relations Factors in Successful Collective Bar-
gaining, S. Rep. under S. Res. 71, 82d Cong., 1st Sess., p. 7 (committee print).
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